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When Liberty and Security Collide:
Foreign Policy Litigation and
the Federal Judiciary
Kirk A. Randazzo'
In the wake of the September i rth attacks, questions regarding the relationship of
civil liberties to foreign affairs have received renewed salience within our society.
This paper reviews historical patterns of decision-making in the U.S. Supreme
Court and the courts of appeals when confronted with questions of individual rights
versus the government's ability to engage in foreign relations. Using an original
dataset of federal cases from 1946 to 2000, this Article examines the influence of
competing preferences and constraints (i.e., individual rights versus security) on
judicial behavior The empirical results indicate that traditional notions of ideology
and preferences over security concerns significantly affect the federal judicial system.
However, examinations of individual court levels reveal that the lower courts
respond more to security concerns, whereas the Supreme Court is influenced solely
by ideological proclivities. Scholars of the judiciary who do not account for these
additional dimensions may not adequately capture the complete decision-making
processes across the judicial system.
;;-f-HE perennial issue of the appropriate balance between civil liber-
I-ties and the demands of national security has lost none of its poi-
gnancy; nor is it any easier today than it was in the past to determine how,
where and when to draw the line between these two sets of interests.2
i Kirk A. Randazzo is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the
University of Kentucky. The author wishes to thank the following individuals for their helpful
comments and suggestions: Thomas Hansford, Burt Monroe, Reginald Sheehan, Christopher
Smith, Donald Songer, and Harold Spaeth. A portion of this research was supported financially
through a grant from the University of Kentucky.
2 Duncan L. Clarke & Edward L. Neveleff, Secrecy, Foreign Intelligence, and CivilLiberties:
Has the Pendulum Swung Too Far?, 99 POL. Scl. Q. 493 (1984).
629
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The terrorist attacks of September I I, 2001, remind us that the fed-
eral courts often are required to resolve questions of individual rights in
lieu of foreign-policy concerns. Unfortunately, the majority of U.S. foreign
policy studies focus on interactions between the executive and legislative
branches of government during the conduct of foreign affairs. In an effort
to concentrate on the President, Congress, or agencies such as the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the Department of State, these examinations
neglect the roles played by the judiciary. While the political branches of
government most directly determine policy outcomes, the contributions
of the judiciary are no less significant. Many foreign-policy questions in-
volve constitutional interpretations regarding the authority vested in the
executive and legislative branches. Since the courts possess theauthority
to interpret the Constitution, judicial decisions often define the parameters
and boundaries within which the political branches must operate. Despite
this substantial impact on foreign-policy decision-making, little scholarship
exists analyzing the influence of the judiciary in foreign affairs.
Three significant limitations hinder our systematic understanding of
how the judiciary operates in the foreign relations scheme. First, within
the small body of literature examining courts and foreign policy, a majority
of these studies utilize qualitative techniques to assess historical relation-
ships between the three branches of the federal government. These stud-
ies examine whether the Supreme Court defers to either the President or
Congress in the formulation and exercise of U.S. foreign policy. While these
doctrinal analyses provide detailed descriptions of specific case histories,
they do not develop broad theoretical contributions to judicial behavior.
Consequently, a richer set of theoretical expectations is needed to under-
stand judicial behavior in foreign affairs.
Second, the constitutional authority imposed upon the judiciary extends
beyond balancing disputes between the political branches of government.
Courts are responsible for protecting the civil liberties of citizens within
the United States. Arguably, this responsibility becomes difficult to fulfill
because judges often encounter competing principles and preferences (i.e.
individual rights versus security). Weighing these potentially contradictory
aspects presents a substantially different challenge than resolving domestic
policy disputes, and scholars must account for these competing principles
to better understand the decision-making processes outside the domestic
context.
Finally, most studies focus exclusively on the Supreme Court while
virtually ignoring the lower federal courts. Since the Supreme Court has
control over its docket and may reduce the number of cases it hears, the de-
cisions of the lower federal courts become increasingly significant because
the possibility of review is reduced. Unfortunately, a dearth of empirical
analyses exists which systematically explore patterns of judicial behavior
under these circumstances.
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This Article explores judicial influences in foreign-policy litigation
across all three levels of the federal judiciary focusing specifically on the
effects of competing preferences and constraints. In the following sections,
I first describe the paradoxical dilemma facing judges in foreign policy
cases, highlighting some anecdotal evidence pertaining to judges' respon-
sibilities. I then develop theoretical expectations for judicial behavior and
empirically test these expectations using a unique dataset.
I. THE PARADOX OF FOREIGN POLICY ADJUDICATION
According to Robert J. Spitzer, presidential-congressional relations are dif-
ferent in the realm of foreign affairs as compared to domestic matters. 3 As
the President and Congress expand their regulatory capabilities, individ-
ual civil liberties often are sacrificed. Yet, as the Constitution dictates, the
courts are responsible for protecting the rights of citizens within the United
States. This creates a paradox for the courts when called upon to resolve
foreign-policy disputes:
The courts have no authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations. They are,
however, authorized to adjudicate all cases or controversies properly be-
fore them in accordance with the applicable law. Their function is essential
to the maintenance of the separation of powers among the branches and
the protection of individual rights. Since no other branch has the author-
ity to exercise the judicial power, practices that permit the Executive [or
Legislature] to exercise unilateral decision-making authority in particular
court cases may be inconsistent with the constitutional plan. On its face, the
Constitution does not exclude or limit the courts' authority in cases or con-
troversies touching on foreign relations. Furthermore, matters with foreign
relations implications may involve the legal rights and duties of individuals
or the states under federal law clearly within the courts' authority. Judicial
deference or abstention in such cases may compromise the authority of the
federal courts. 4
The extent to which judicial opinions offer insights into institutional
differences among federal judges' attitudes is uncertain. A brief examina-
tion of opinion language leads to the conclusion that federal judges, regard-
less of their institutional position, heavily weigh the rights of individuals
versus the authority of the government to engage in foreign relations.
3 ROBERT J. SPITZER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: EXECUTIVE HEGEMONY ATTHE CROSSROADS
OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 142-43 (1993).
4 Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deferece in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 805, 807
(1989).
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There are several district court examples. For instance, Judge Murphy
of the Northern District Court for California stated, "Those who founded
this nation placed upon the judiciary the grave responsibility of safeguard-
ing constitutional rights regardless of from what quarter comes the attack."5
Similarly, in United States v. Molina-Chacon,6 Judge Platt of the Eastern Dis-
trict Court for New York admonished, "Of course, United States courts
must guard against those rare situations where overzealous United States
law enforcement personnel attempt to ... circumvent constitutional safe-
guards." 7 These opinions indicate that district court judges are cognizant
of their responsibility to ensure individual liberties. However, these judges
also are cognizant of the government's authority to formulate U.S. foreign
policy. Judge Zilly of the Western District Court for Washington warns, a
court "must be particularly careful not to substitute its own judgment as to
what is 'desirable' or its own evaluation of what the executive branch may
have intended by a given policy."8
Similar sentiments are identified in the opinions of appeals court judg-
es. Several cases demonstrate these judges balance their responsibility as
"defender of civil liberties" versus the government's ability to dictate for-
eign policy. Judge Murnaghan of the Fourth Circuit writes
History teaches us how easily the spectre of a threat to national security
may be used to justify a wide variety of repressive government actions. A
blind acceptance by the courts of the government's insistence on the need
for secrecy, without notice to others, without argument, and without a state-
ment of reasons, would impermissibly compromise the independence of
the judiciary and open the door to possible abuse.9
Likewise, the case United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan'° brings a statement from Judge Edwards of the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals: "It is the historic role of the Judiciary to see that
in periods of crisis, when the challenge to constitutional freedoms is the
greatest, the Constitution of the United States remains the supreme law of
our land."" While these cases initially lead to the conclusion that the courts
of appeals may be more sensitive to civil liberties concerns, other cases ad-
monish appellate judges to refrain from intruding upon the government's
authority, especially the executive's authority, to act in foreign affairs. Judge
Cummings of the Seventh Circuit captures this judicial balancing:
5 Parker v. Lester, 98 E Supp. 300,308 (N.D. Cal. 195i).
6 United States v. Molina-Chacon, 627 E Supp. 1253 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
7 Id. at I26o.
8 Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 85o E Supp. 91o, 915 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
9 In re Washington Post Co. v. Soussoudis, 807 F 2d. 383,391-92 (4th Cir. 1986).
io United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 444 F. 2d 651 (6th Cir. 197i).
i i Id. at 664.
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While the courts will scrutinize executive and legislative action in sever-
al substantive areas touching on foreign relations, the standard of review
in those cases is nonetheless a very deferential one. For example, an area
concerning foreign affairs that has been uniformly found appropriate for
judicial review is the protection of individual or constitutional rights from
government action."
The language from these circuit courts' opinions reflects the similar at-
titude of the district courts. It is therefore apparent that judges presiding
in the lower federal courts view their responsibilities in a similar fashion.
The opinions consistently stress an initial deference to the policymaking
branches of government, especially in foreign affairs, while at the same
time monitoring potential infringements of constitutional liberties.
Decisions by the Supreme Court indicate that the justices maintain
analogous views of their responsibilities. For example, Chief Justice War-
ren claimed, "When Congress' exercise of one of its enumerated powers
clashes with those individual liberties protected by the Bill of Rights, it
is our 'delicate and difficult task' to determine whether the resulting re-
striction on freedom can be tolerated." 3 The same year Warren wrote this
decision, Justice Black delivered the majority opinion in which the Court
stated, "Our Constitution governs us and we must never forget that our
Constitution limits the Government to those powers specifically granted
or those that are necessary and proper to carry out the specifically granted
ones." 4 However, the Supreme Court has also rendered decisions urging ju-
dicial restraint in foreign-affairs litigation. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,'5 the
Court stated that matters relating "to the conduct of foreign relations.., are
so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be
largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference." 6
The cases cited from the district courts, courts of appeals, and Supreme
Court provide somewhat contradictory, anecdotal evidence about potential
influences on judicial role perceptions. On the one hand, it is apparent that
judges from all three levels believe the courts possess a responsibility to
protect individual rights from governmental intrusion even in the realm of
foreign relations.This responsibility, however, is to be approached with ini-
tial deference to the government and sensitivity to its authority for formu-
lating foreign policy. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has recognized
that some foreign-relations matters are beyond judicial review.
Since the anecdotal evidence is inconclusive, an examination of previ-
ous empirical analyses is helpful understand judicial behavior in this area.
12 Flynn v. Shultz, 748 F2d. 1186, 119 0-9 1 (7th Cir. 1984).
13 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).
14 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967).
15 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
16 Id. at 589.
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Unfortunately, few empirical studies, which focus on judicial involvement
in foreign policy litigation, exist. One notable study, conducted by Craig R.
Ducat and Robert L. Dudley, analyzes the adjudication of cases involving
presidential power at the federal district court level.' 7 They note that the
"few constraints the courts have imposed upon the executive in peacetime
all but vanish in times of war and national emergency."' 8 This conclusion
supports the courts' opinions discussed above, which urged deference to
the political branches of government, especially when a security threat ex-
ists. Kimi King and James Meernik have published two studies analyz-
ing how the Supreme Court has treated challenges to presidents' exercise
of executive powers.' 9 The authors found that since the post-Vietnam era,
the Supreme Court has shown a tendency to side in favor of the execu-
tive.20 However, "when executive powers conflict with civil liberties, the
Supreme Court tends to take the side of individual rights. ' ' 2I While these
studies are not directly comparable, since Ducat and Dudley did not test
for civil liberties conflicts similar to the King and Meernik analyses, they
indirectly support Burbank and Friedman's contention about institutional
influences on judicial behavior.2 However, Burbank and Friedman's analy-
sis did not include the courts of appeals because there was no previous
research which examined foreign affairs litigation.23 While both lower court
judges and Supreme Court justices possess initial proclivities favoring the
federal government, it is unclear whether both groups respond similarly to
civil liberties challenges. The empirical analysis in this paper conducts this
examination at each federal level-district courts, courts of appeals, and
the Supreme Court-to determine whether specific stimuli exert similar
influences across the federal judiciary.
17 Craig R. Ducat & Robert L. Dudley, Federal District Judges and Presidential Power
During the Postwar Era, 5 J. POL. 98 (1989).
18 Id. at 99.
19 Kimi Lynn King & James Meernik, The "Sole Organ" Before the Court: Presidential Power
in Foreign Policy Cases, 179o-1996, 28 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 666 (1998) [hereinafter King &
Meernik, The "Sole Organ" Before the Court]; Kimi Lynn King & James Meernik, The Supreme
Court and the Powers of the Executive: The Adjudication of Foreign Policy, 52 POL. RES. Q. 8oi
(1999) [hereinafter King & Meernik, Adjudication of Foreign Policy].
20 See King & Meernik, The "Sole Organ" Before the Court, supra note 19, at 667.
21 Id. at 815.
22 Seegenerally Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, ReconsideringJudicial Independence,
in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH, (Stephen B.
Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002).
23 The courts of appeals are deliberately excluded from this comparison because no
previous research has examined this level in relation to foreign affairs litigation.
[Vol. 94
LIBERTY OR SECURITY
II. THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS
A common element of the theories regarding international relations (par-
ticularly the neo-liberal theories), constitutional law, and judicial politics is
that the internal dynamics substantially impact individual behavior.24 One
of the most important facets for the judiciary involves the application of the
attitudinal model.25 Scholars relying on the attitudinal model operate under
the assumption that judges are policy "maximizers," who render decisions
based on their personal policy preferences.26 However, measuring personal
preferences is often difficult. The majority of research developing quan-
titative measures focuses on the preferences of Supreme Court justices.27
Comparable research of quantitative measures for lower court judges is
scarce. Therefore, to measure the preferences of lower court judges, schol-
ars rely on partisan affiliations of either the judges themselves or of their
appointing presidents. 18
An underlying assumption of the partisan surrogate is that this measure
focuses mainly on preferences pertaining to domestic issues. One must
question whether attitudes toward foreign affairs elicit similar partisan
responses as attitudes towards domestic policy issues. Ole R. Holsti and
James N. Rosenau rely on survey evidence of American elites to examine
this question.29 They discovered a strong and consistent relationship be-
tween domestic and foreign policy attitudes, which correlate with partisan
affiliations and ideological beliefs. Assuming that judges possess similar at-
titudes as other elites within the United States, one may argue that partisan
24 See Kirk A. Randazzo, Foreign Affairs Litigation in the U.S. Courts ofAppeals: A Preliminary
Analysis, 25 JUST. Sys. J. 227 (2004).
25 See generally Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A
Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYs. J. 219 (1999) (discussing partisan affiliation in the lower federal
courts).
z6 See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, 'TE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrITUDINAL
MODEL REVISITED (2002); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATrITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
27 See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002); Jeffrey
A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM.
POL. SC. REV. 557 (1989). But see Lee Epstein, Valerie Hoekstra, Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J.
Spaeth, Do Political Preferences Change? A Longitudinal Study of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 6o J.
POL. 8oi (1998); Lee Epstein & Carol Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences, 40 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 261 (1996).
z8 See generally Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Pary to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A
Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219 (1999) (discussing partisan affiliation in the lower federal
courts).
29 Ole R. Holsti & James N. Rosenau, The Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs of American
Leaders, 32 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 248 (1988); Ole R. Holsti & James N. Rosenau, Consensus Lost.
Consensus Regained? Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Leaders, 1976-198o, 30 INT'L STUD. Q. 375
(1986).
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affiliations will be related significantly to the disposition of foreign policy
cases. Thus, Democratic judges will be more inclined to render decisions
in favor of civil liberties, and Republican judges will be more likely to rule
in favor of foreign-policy interests.30 Since the courts of appeals and the
Supreme Court are collegial tribunals, this hypothesis applies to their ag-
gregate preferences.
In addition to traditional notions of ideology, though, judges also possess
preferences unique to foreign-policy litigation, namely preferences involv-
ing the security of the United States and its government officials and citi-
zens. 3' The realist paradigm in the international relations literature suggests
that actions of states are defined by the nature of the international system
and are developed according to various external threats and the national
interest of security.32 Though theories of realism dismiss internal dynamics,
one can speculate that these internal components will work together when
the state faces an external threat. From a judicial politics perspective, the
courts should therefore defer to the governmental authority when the state
responds to a security issue. Certainly, one would expect the magnitude of
the stimulus to affect judicial behavior; judges would view the authority of
the government to combat terrorist attacks or espionage within the United
States differently than the government's authority to regulate immigration.
I therefore hypothesize that federal judges will be more likely to support
foreign policy interests if they perceive a security threat exists, regardless
of their individual ideology.
Another aspect of the federal courts involves their adjudicatory re-
sponsibilities. Since the district courts initially decide disputes, they are
responsible for determining questions of fact and law. The courts of ap-
peals are subsequently responsible for reviewing the decisions of the dis-
trict courts as well as for reviewing administrative agency decisions. The
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review decisions rendered by the courts
of appeals, as well as state supreme courts. 33 While the courts of appeals
possess mandatory jurisdiction over district courts, the Supreme Court has
discretionary control over its docket. For the majority of cases, the appeals
courts serve as the court of last resort. According to Donald Songer, "as
the number of litigated cases grows both quantitatively and in complexity,
while the number of cases reviewed by the Supreme Court remains static,
30 These directions reflect traditional liberal and conservative decisions in foreign
affairs.
31 See Randazzo, supra note 24.
32 See Ole R. Holsti, Theories of International Relations and Foreign Policy: Realism and
Its Challengers, in CONTROVERSIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: REALISM AND THE
NEOLIBERAL CHALLENGE 35, 37 (Charles W. Kegley, Jr. ed., 1995).
33 It should also be noted that the Supreme Court possesses original jurisdiction (which
is rarely exercised) in a small number of disputes, mostly between states and in cases involving
foreign diplomats.
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the role of the courts of appeals as the final authoritative policymaker in the
interpretation of many areas of federal law expands apace." 34 Therefore, it
is important to determine how the appellate levels exercise their error cor-
rection responsibilities in relation to district court decisions.
The question becomes whether a systematic difference exists between
the appeals courts and the Supreme Court in terms of their handling of
lower court decisions. Previous research on these appellate error correction
responsibilities indicates that judges on the courts of appeals are more like-
ly to affirm district court decisions. 35 In contrast, an examination of reversal
rates in the U.S. Supreme Court indicates that this judicial body is more
prone to reverse lower court decisions than affirm. 36 Therefore, if the dis-
trict courts rule in favor of civil liberties claims over the interests of foreign
policy, I hypothesize that the courts of appeals will adhere to these rulings
and render a similar decision, or vice versa. Conversely, the Supreme Court
will be more likely to reverse an appeals court decision (this is especially
true if the appeals courts and the district courts issue contradictory rul-
ings, thereby causing disagreement within the judicial system as Perry37
discovers).
In the realm of foreign affairs, several scholars demonstrate the tremen-
dous influence exerted by the executive branch.3 Additional studies dem-
onstrate the extent to which this influence carries to the judicial branch. 39
34 Donald R. Songer, The Circuit Courts of Appeals, in T[E AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT 35,35 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., I991).
35 Sue Davis and Donald R. Songer, The Changing Role of the United States Courts of
Appeals: The Flow of Litigation Revisited, 13 JUST. Sys. J. 323 (1988-89 ). Seegenerally Donald
R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Who Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs and Underdogs in the United
States Courts of Appeals, 36 Am. J. POL. ScI. 235, 256(1992) (recognizing that because courts of
appeals have mandatory jurisdiction, these courts must accept even frivolous appeals, which is
a contributing factor to the courts' higher rate of affirming the lower court decisions).
36 LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH, AND THOMAS G. WALKER, ME
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS, SECOND EDITION 212-
I9 (1996).
37 H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE:AGENDA SETTING INTHE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT (199 1). One of Perry's main contentions is that circuit conflict and internal conflict (i.e.
diagreement between district courts and appeals courts) lead to a higher probability of the
Supreme Court granting certiorari. See Perry chapters 8 and 9.
38 See David Gray Adler, Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 19, 19 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds.
1996); RANDALL WALTON BLAND, THE BLACK ROBE AND THE BALD EAGLE: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1961, SECOND EDITION (I99); LOUIS
FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 185 (1995); Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS
BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 94-95 (4th ed. 1997) (1978). MICHAEL A. GENOVESE,
TbE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, 1789-2000 (2001); ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1989).
39 See Ducat & Dudley, supra note 17, at 98; King & Meernik, Adjudication of Foreign
Policy, supra note I9, at 8oi; Jeff Yates & Andrew Whitford, Presidential Power and the United
States Supreme Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 539, 539 (1998).
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As Ducat and Dudley conclude, foreign policy-making is an area dominat-
ed so extensively by the executive branch that courts are unlikely to chal-
lenge the President's power.40 Although Ducat and Dudley argue that more
popular presidents receive greater levels of deference by the judiciary than
unpopular ones, 4' they discover an insignificant statistical relationship for
the district courts. Therefore a question remains about the potential influ-
ence of presidential popularity, and whether this influence extends to all
levels of the judiciary. Consequently, I hypothesize that federal judges will
be more likely to render decisions favoring foreign policy (and against civil
liberties claims) when presidential popularity is high.
Finally, certain legal issues also are expected to impact judicial deci-
sion-making in foreign affairs. Previous studies indicate that the presence
of a specific constitutional challenge increases the likelihood that courts
will rule against the interests of the federal government.42 Thus, I hypoth-
esize that even though judges may be initially hesitant to rule against the
government in foreign policy cases, they will be more likely to do so if the
parties identify a specific constitutional violation.
Additionally, the presence of a claim citing international law or treaty
obligations may affect judicial behavior. A limited number of studies dem-
onstrate that American courts are becoming increasingly more sensitive to
claims of international law violations.43 Norms of international law or pro-
visions within bilateral or multilateral treaties often attempt to explicitly
identify individual rights against which governments cannot intrude.While
some courts in the United States may be are hesitant to cite international
law as precedent, especially in opposition to the federal government, stud-
ies indicate that judges may rely on international legal principles to extend
individual protections. Therefore, I hypothesize the presence of an inter-
national law or treaty claim will increase the likelihood of federal courts
rendering decisions in favor of civil liberties.
The final legal influence involves potential threshold issues involved
in a case. Several studies comment on the deference given by judges to
the federal government when threshold issues, such as a political ques-
tion or act of state doctrine issue, are present.44 These analyses indicate
40 See Ducat & Dudley, supra note 17, at 115.
41 See id. at III.
42 See SUSAN R. BURGESS, CONTEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY: kE ABORTION AND
WAR POWERS DEBATES (1992).
43 See Martin A. Rogoff, Interpretation of International Agreements by Domestic Courts and the
Politics of International Treaty Relations: Reflections on Some Recent Decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, I I AM. U. J. INTL. L. AND POL'. 559 (1996); and, David J. Scheffer, International
Judicial Intervention, 102 FOR. POL'Y. 34 (1996).
44 See, e.g., David Barron, Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: the President's
Non-Enforcement Power, 63 L. and Cont. Prob. 61 (2ooo); BLAND, supra note 38; WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998); THOMAS M. FRANCK,
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federal courts often avoid addressing the merit of cases challenging federal
authority to engage in foreign affairs by refusing to decide those cases on
the grounds of threshold issues. Therefore, if judges are asked to resolve a
threshold issue, I hypothesize that they will be more likely to rule in defer-
ence to foreign policy interests.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
Data for this analysis come from an original sample of federal court deci-
sions from 1946 to 2000 involving foreign affairs and civil liberties. Fol-
lowing several international relations analyses,4s foreign policy is defined
as any issue involving relations between the federal government and indi-
viduals, groups, and nations outside its borders. 46 While the cutoff points in
the timeline are somewhat arbitrary, a rationale exists for this choice. The
sequence begins in 1946, a year in which the United States transitioned
from World War II to the Cold War (as one of two international superpow-
ers) and reorganized some of its bureaucratic agencies accordingly-most
notably the foreign policy and intelligence-gathering agencies. Addition-
ally, with the creation of the United Nations, the international system en-
tered into a new era with nations becoming increasingly interdependent.
To include cases before 1946 risks analyzing qualitatively different issues;
issues arising before World War I-when the United States possessed a
different perception of its international responsibilities-and also from the
war itself. Similarly, the time sequence ends at the year 2000 so as to not
include cases arising under a new presidential regime (President George
POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JuDIcIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS?
(1992); J. Graham Noyes, Cutting the President Off From Tin Cup Diplomacy, 24 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 481, 464 (199I); Charney, supra note 4, at 805; and Malvina Halberstam, Sabbatino
Resurrected. The Act of State Doctrine in the Revised Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 79
AM. J. INT'L L. 68, 68 (1985).
45 See EARL H. FRY, STAN A. TAYLOR, AND ROBERT S. WOOD, AMERICA THE VINCIBLE: U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1994).
46 As several scholars note, contemporary definitions of foreign policy are becoming
increasingly vague and more inclusive. See Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann,
Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry, 33 J. STUD. Q. 361 (1989);
Randall B. Ripley & James M. Lindsay, Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress: An Overview and
Preview, in CONGRESS RESURGENT. FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY ON CAPITOL HILL I (Randall
B. Ripley & James M. Lindsay, eds., 1993); Eugene R. Wittkopf & Christopher M. Jones,
New Priorities for a New Era? Or Afloat in Unchartered Waters, in THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY, 'HIRD EDITION I (Eugene R. Wittkopf & Christopher M. Jones, eds., 1999).
This definition preserves the continuum of issues ranging from the most foreign to the
most domestic (see MARIE T HENEHAN, FOREIGN POLICY AND CONGRESS: AN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS PERSPECTIVE (2000)) and includes issues pertaining to diplomatic relations with
other nations; issues with foreign nationals, states or international corporations; immigration;
international law; and military relations.
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W Bush) and, more importantly, issues following the September i I, 2001,
terrorist attacks.
Cases for this analysis were identified using a Lexis-Nexis keyword
search. I retrieved numerous cases for each federal judicial level using the
following issues as keywords: foreign policy, foreign affairs, national secu-
rity, national defense, war powers, military, immigration, international law,
treaties, ambassadors, and diplomacy. Initially, I identified approximately
io,ooo cases each for the district courts and the courts of appeals, and 400
cases for the Supreme Court. Further scrutiny (i.e., eliminating observable
economic cases and retaining potential civil liberties cases) reduced this
number to approximately 2,9oo district court cases, 2,700 courts of appeals
cases, and exactly 123 Supreme Court decisions involving a civil liberties
violation in combination with the various foreign-relations issues. 47 As I
stated at the beginning of this paper, the primary focus of this research
is to examine how federal judges balance claims of civil liberties against
foreign policy issues. Therefore, I exclude cases that do not possess a civil
liberties claim, though a foreign-policy issue is present. Similarly, I exclude
civil liberties cases that are not combined with a foreign-policy issue. I de-
fine civil liberties as the fundamental freedoms from which individuals are
protected against governmental intrusion.4s Examples of civil liberties in-
clude First Amendment protections of free speech and press, Fourth, Fifth
and Sixth Amendment protections for individuals subjected to the criminal
justice system, and other rights or protections, such as access to an open
government. Random samples for the lower federal courts were drawn
subsequently from these remaining cases, with the universe of Supreme
Court decisions included. Decisions for each judicial level were coded ac-
cording to litigant characteristics, legal issues, final disposition, and judge
characteristics.
The dependent variable for this analysis is whether the federal courts
voted in favor of civil liberties (coded as 'i') or against the civil liberties
claim-in support of the foreign policy (coded as 'o'). It is important to
note that the federal government does not have to be a litigant to a par-
ticular case in order to express a foreign-policy interest in the outcome. For
example, one case involved a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) claim
against Lockheed Martin for the details of certain defense contracts, al-
47 It is important to note that this number reflects decisions with published opinions.
A cursory examination of unpublished decisions contained with the Lexis-Nexis database
reveal that these decisions often involve trivial, mundane issues, and do not contain detailed
opinions, nor are they considered precedent by the appellate courts. For these reasons, they
are excluded from the analysis. However, it is necessary to note that the conclusions are
generalized only to published decisions.
48 LEE EPSTEIN AND THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING AMERICA:
RIGHTS, LIBERTIES AND JUSTICE, FIFTH EDITION 101 (5th ed. 2003).
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leged to be public information. 49 In this instance, a ruling in favor of the
FOIA claim would be coded in favor of civil liberties (i.e., open access to
information), whereas a ruling in favor of Lockheed Martin to keep the
records secret would be coded in favor of foreign affairs. Since the depen-
dent variable is dichotomous, linear regression models are insufficient.5° I
therefore rely on maximum likelihood techniques to specify appropriate
multivariate models.
As I mentioned earlier, measuring the personal preferences of judges
(especially lower court judges) is extremely difficult. 5' Consequently, I
rely on the partisan affiliation of a judge's appointing president to serve as
proxy for preferences. Initially judges appointed by Republican presidents
are coded 'o' and those appointed by Democratic presidents are coded 'I.
However, since the unit of analysis is aggregated to the court level, indi-
vidual preference measures are combined. This combination is captured
through the independent variable court partisanship, which is defined as the
proportion of judges appointed by Democratic presidents. Since the major-
ity of district court decisions are delivered by a single judge, values for this
variable will be either 'o' for a Republican appointment or ' for Democrat.
However, in those instances in which the district court sits as a three-judge
panel, and for the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, the values for
court partisanship will range from 'o' to 'I' with most entries falling propor-
tionately within those extremes. As indicated previously, I hypothesize that
Democratic judges will be more likely to rule against foreign-policy inter-
ests (i.e., to rule in favor of civil liberties). Therefore, I expect a positive
relationship to exist between courtpartisanship and the dependent variable;
as the proportion of Democrat judges on a court increases, the likelihood of
a decision favoring civil liberties claims will increase.
The existence of security preferences are measured by two separate
dummy variables. The first, national security defense, controls for the pres-
ence of a specific national security defense, raised by the federal govern-
ment. For example, the Freedom of Information Act allows the government
to withhold information if access could jeopardize the national security of
the United States.52 If the government raises a specific defense of national
49 United States v. General Dynamics, 315 ESupp.zd 939 (2004).
50 J. SCOTT LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED DEPENDENT
VARIABLES (1997); ScoTT R. ELIASON, MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION: LOGIC AND
PRACTICE (1993); JOHN H. ALDRICH AND FORREST D. NELSON, LINEAR PROBABILITY, LOGIT AND
PROBIT MODELS (1984); G.S. MADDALA, LIMITED DEPENDENT AND QUALITATIVE VARIABLES IN
ECONOMETRICS (1983).
51 See Kirk A. Randazzo & Reginald S. Sheehan, Measuring Judges' Ideology on the
U.S. Courts of Appeals (2001) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) for a more
detailed description of the difficulties inherent in empirically measuring personal preferences
of appellate judges.
52 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2002).
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security (coded 'i'), then I hypothesize that federal judges will rule in favor
of foreign policy interests, even when controlling for their personal ideol-
ogy. Therefore a negative relationship should exist between national secu-
rity defense and the dependent variable.
The variable criminal case controls for the presence of a violation of
criminal law (coded 'I'). Criminal violations of foreign policies may also
present a security issue, because often these violations occur in combina-
tion with an intrusion upon U.S. territory or an attack upon government of-
ficials or citizens by foreign nationals.5 3 I therefore hypothesize a negative
relationship between criminalcase and the dependent variable s4
The variable lower court directionality measures the case disposition by
the district court or federal agency conducting the trial. The variable is cod-
ed 'Y if the lower court (or agency) ruled in favor of foreign affairs interests,
'2' if the court rendered a mixed decision (both for and against governmen-
tal interests), and '3' if the court ruled against federal government interests.
Theoretical expectations indicate the courts of appeals will be more likely
to affirm a district court (or administrative agency) ruling and the Supreme
Court more likely to reverse the lower court ruling. Therefore, I anticipate
a positive relationship to exist for the courts of appeals and a negative rela-
tionship to exist for the Supreme Court.
To measure the strength of the chief executive, I rely on presidential
approval scores calculated through Gallup Poll surveys.55 The data reflect
the percentage of the public that view the president in a positive fashion.
As Ducat and Dudley note, "[slince a one-point-in-time measure could be
distorted by last-minute changes in public mood, especially at a point fall-
ing so late in the process of judicial decision, we computed average mea-
sures of presidential prestige for each decision." 6 Following their example,
I aggregate the Gallup surveys to provide an annual measure of presiden-
tial approval. As noted earlier, I expect courts to exert higher degrees of
deference to foreign policy initiatives when the president possesses high
presidential approval scores. Thus, the variable presidential approval should
be related negatively to the dependent variable.
The complexity of specific cases could be the result of certain legal
challenges or issues. Three dummy variables measure legal issues that
might appear within a case. Constitutional challenge tracks whether a litigant
53 Examples include convictions for espionage or treason, drug-related offenses
(importation or arrests on the high seas) or of foreign nationals operating within U.S.
territories.
54 It is possible that some criminal cases will also present specific national security
concerns (i.e., terrorism, espionage or treason), making the impact of security preferences
more prevalent on judicial behavior.
55 Available at http://brain.gallup.com/documents/topics.aspx#P; also available at www.
ropercenter.uconn.edu.
56 Ducat & Dudley, supra note 19, at io6-07.
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alleges a specific constitutional violation, such as a violation of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. I hypothesize that judges may be sensi-
tive to constitutional challenges, and consequently, will be more likely to
rule in favor of civil liberties claims.
The variable international law or treaty measures the presence of an
issue related to international law or treaties signed by the United States
(both bilateral, such as extradition treaties with specific countries, and mul-
tilateral, such as the Geneva Convention). These treaties, or other facets
of international law, often define specific rights afforded to individuals
that governments should not trespass. I hypothesize that the presence of a
claim focused on a violation of a specific treaty or norm of international law
will persuade federal judges to rule in favor of individuals (i.e., against the
interests of the federal government). A positive relationship should exist
between the variables constitutional challenge and international law or treaty
and the dependent variable. The dummy variable threshold issue measures
the presence of a threshold issue such as the political question or act of
state doctrine. As hypothesized, the presence of a threshold issue should be
negatively related to the likelihood of the courts ruling in support of civil
liberties claims (i.e., judges will be more likely to rule in favor of federal
government interests).
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The descriptive results presented in Table I provide preliminary evidence
concerning generals levels of deference to foreign policy initiatives. As the
table indicates, the district courts and courts of appeals rarely constrain
governmental interests in foreign affairs-ruling in favor of civil liberties
only 37.9% (for district courts) and 37.8% (for appeals courts) of the time.
Standing in slight contrast is the Supreme Court - though somewhat def-
erential to foreign policy initiatives, it ruled in favor of civil liberties 43.9%
of the time.
TABLE I
DESCRIPTIVE EXAMINATION OF COURT DECISIONS
Foreign-Policy Decision Civil Liberties Decision
District Courts 62.1% 37.9%
Appeals Courts 62.2 37.8
Supreme Court 56.1 43.9
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While the preliminary evidence presented in these three tables offers
insight into my first general hypothesis, a more rigorous analysis is needed.
Therefore, to examine systematically the empirical influences of the in-
dependent variables, I conducted separate analyses for the district courts,
courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court. The results of these analyses
are reported in Table 2. Each of the models performs adequately, although
the district courts model only offers a slight reduction of error (5.3%) com-
pared to the appeals courts model (24.1%) and the Supreme Court model
06.6%).57
The first model examines influences on the federal district courts. Ac-
cording to Table 2, only the variables measuring court preferences over
security concerns-national security defense and criminal case--exert statisti-
cally significant influences in the expected direction. I hypothesized that
these variables would be negatively related to the likelihood of civil liber-
ties' decisions. These hypotheses are confirmed by the empirical results.
Unfortunately, the variables court partisanship, presidential approval, consti-
tutional challenge, international law or treaty, and threshold issue do not signifi-
cantly affect judicial behavior.
While determining the statistical significance of independent variables
is noteworthy, a more interesting finding occurs when one examines the
changes in predicted probabilities for each equation, the results of which
are presented in Table 3. These values measure the probability of a deci-
sion in favor of civil liberties and are calculated by adjusting the variable
of interest from its minimum to its maximum value while simultaneously
holding the remaining variables at their mean values. An examination of
Table 3 indicates that district court judges are 21.9% less likely to render
decisions in favor of civil liberties (or, conversely, are 21.9% more likely to
render decisions favoring foreign policy) if a specific national security defense
is present in the case. Similarly, if these judges resolve criminal cases, they
are 19.4% less likely to render decisions favoring civil liberties.
The second empirical model evaluates the courts of appeals. Accord-
ing to the results listed in Table 2, the variables court partisanship, national
security defense, criminal case, and lower court directionality exert statistically
significant influences (though the variables nationalsecurity defense and crim-
inal case barely achieve significance). I hypothesized that court partisanship
and lower court directionality would be related positively to the dependent
variable while the remaining two variables would possess a negative rela-
tionship. These hypotheses are supported empirically, while the expect-
57 The reduction of error statistic is calculated using the formula provided in Timothy
M. Hagle & Glenn E. Mitchell, Goodness-of-fitMeasuresforProbitandLogit, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI.
762, 781 n.13 (1992).
ROE % corr redicted - % in modal categoryl
RE ) oo - % in modal category J
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TABLE 2
PROBIT ANALYSES OF INDIVIDUAL COURT LEVELS
Coefficients
(Robust Standard Errors)
court partisanship
national security defense
criminal case
lower court directionality
presidential approval
constitutional challenge
international law/treaty
threshold issue
Constant
N
Log Likelihood
xz
Probability >X2
Pseudo R2
Null Model
% Correctly Predicted
% Reduction of Error
Model 1
District Courts
.133
(.171)
-.682***
(.264)
-.570***
(.204)
N/A
-.008
(.007)
-.146
(.168)
-.220
(.249)
.111
(.189)
.335
(.528)
251
-156.961
15.44
.031
.054
37.9%
64.1%
5.3%
Model 2
Appeals Courts
.783***
(.292)
-.590*
(.358)
-.355*
(.199)
.477***
(.123)
.000
(.008)
-.213
(.209)
-.159
(.217)
-.326
(.205)
-1.030
(.554)
230
-133.953
28.90
.000
.122
37.8
71.3
24.1
Model 3
Supreme Court
2.979***
(.962)
-.235
(.498)
.084
(.396)
-.095
(.141)
-.018
(.012)
.359
(.247)
.373
(.437)
-.099
(.310)
-.183
(.782)
123
-75.411
17.61
.024
.106
43.9
63.4
16.6
Dependent variable: case outcome (1 for civil liberties; 0 for foreign policy)
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01
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ed influences of the variables presidential approval, constitutional challenge,
international law or treaty, and threshold issue do not achieve statistical sig-
nificance. The predicted probabilities-listed in Table 3-for courtparti-
sanship indicate that appeals court panels dominated by Democratic judges
are 28.5% more likely to rule in favor of civil liberties than are panels con-
trolled by Republican judges. Additionally, if the lower court initially ruled
in favor of civil liberties, the appeals courts are 36.1% more likely to follow
this ruling and render a decision favoring civil liberties. Table 3 also reveals
when appellate judges confront a national security defense, they are 18.5%
less likely to support civil liberties (or, conversely, 18.5% more likely to
support foreign policy concerns). Finally, when appellate judges resolve a
criminal appeal (as indicated in the variable criminal case), they are 12.9%
less likely to render a decision favoring civil liberties.
TABLE 3
CHANGES IN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES (PERCENT CHANGE)
District Courts Appeals Courts Supreme Court
court partisanship 4.9% 28.5% 63.9%
national security defense -21.9 -18.4 -7.8
criminal case -19.4 -12.9 3.1
lower court directionality N/A 36.1 -7.9
presidential approval -15.6 0.3 -29.3
constitutional challenge -5.3 -7.9 13.7
international law/treaty -7.8 -5.7 13.4
threshold issue 4.4 -11.6 -3.5
Note: Changes in predicted probabilities are calculated by moving the variable of
interest from its minimum to its maximum value while simultaneously holding the
remaining variables at their mean values.
The final empirical model examines influences on the Supreme Court.
According to Table 2 only one variable achieves statistical significance:
court partisanship. The predicted probabilities in Table 3 demonstrate that
as more justices appointed by Democratic presidents assume the Supreme
Court bench, their decisions are substantially more likely to support civil
liberties claims than when the Supreme Court is controlled by Republican-
appointed justices. The Democratic justices are 63.9% more likely to ren-
der decisions favoring civil liberties than their Republican colleagues. The
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hypotheses for the remaining variables are not supported by the empirical
evidence displayed in Table 2.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The opening quotation, from Clarke and Neveleff (1984),8 mentioned the
difficulty for judges in maintaining an appropriate balance between civil
liberties and foreign affairs. Through a series of empirical analyses on all
levels of the federal judiciary, one can reasonably conclude that judges fa-
vor the latter claim over the former. The lower federal courts seldom rule
in favor of civil liberties claims (37.9% for the district courts and 37.8% for
the appeals courts). The Supreme Court is more sensitive to individual
challenges, supporting these claims in 43.9% of their decisions. However,
it is apparent that the federal courts more often defer to governmental au-
thority in foreign relations.
While the federal judiciary is prone to support foreign policy interests,
it is also important to understand the conditions under which these judges
will rule in favor of civil liberties claims. An important influence is the ideo-
logical preferences of judges as measured by partisan affiliations of the ap-
pointing president. The empirical results provide general support for my
hypothesis: liberal judges are more likely to render decisions in favor of
civil liberties. However, this result does not hold for all levels of the federal
judiciary. They are most influential in the Supreme Court, where Demo-
cratic justices are approximately 64% more likely to vote in favor of civil
liberties than Republicans. However, they are only moderately influential
in the courts of appeals, where panels dominated by Democratic judges are
28.5% more likely to render decisions supporting civil liberties than pan-
els dominated by Republicans. Yet, the impact of ideological preferences
among district court judges is non-existent statistically. Within the federal
trial courts there is no significant difference between Democratic and Re-
publican judges.
My second general hypothesis focuses on judicial preferences pertain-
ing to security. I claimed that judges will be more likely to render deci-
sions favoring foreign policy interests when the state responds to a security
threat. The empirical results support this hypothesis, but only within the
lower federal courts. The Supreme Court is not affected significantly by
either the presence of a nationalsecurity defense or a criminalcase. In contrast,
both variables exert significant influences in the lower courts. Yet, even
here the effects are more pronounced in the district courts, and barely sig-
nificant for the courts of appeals. It therefore appears that federal judges
58 Clark & Neveleff, supra note 2, at 493.
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become less influenced by security issues as one moves up the judicial
hierarchy.
While these results shed light on judicial behavior before 2ooo, ques-
tions remain how the events on September i ith affected the judicial deci-
sion process. The federal courts have already issued contradictory rulings
in recent cases such as Rasul v. Bush,s9 Padilla v. Rumsfeld,0 Hamdi v. Rums-
feld,' Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft,62 and North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v.
Ashcroft,63 which help illustrate the influence of competing preferences.
However, additional decisions (at all levels) are required in order to deter-
mine systematic patterns of influence. What is important to remember is
that federal litigation often raises issues which involve competing prefer-
ences. Scholars of the judiciary who do not account for these additional
dimensions may not adequately capture the complete decision-making
process.
59 Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C 2002) (holding that writs of habeas corpus
are not available to aliens held outside the sovereign territory of the United States, thus,
neither this court nor any U.S. court has jurisdiction to entertain such a claim), aff'd, 321 F3d
1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
6o Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the District Court has
jurisdiction to determine whether a writ of habeas corpus may be issued and that the Non-
Detention Act prohibits the detention of American citizens without express congressional
authority), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
61 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F 3 d 450 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that the fact that an enemy
combatant is a U.S. citizen and is being detained in the United States does not affect the
legal implications of his status as an enemy combatant, and likewise, a court cannot set aside
executive decisions to detain enemy combatants without clear evidence that it is a violation
of the Constitution or the laws of Congress), vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
62 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F3d 68I (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution confers a public right of access to deportation
hearings).
63 North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2002) (holding
that the First Amendment does not confer upon the press and public a right of access to
deportation hearings regarding national security concerns).
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